
PERJASA SESSION 2021

Analisa Kaedah Serangan Siber Menggunakan Honeypot



CONTENT

- What is honeypot
- Honeynet
- What is T-Pot
- T-Pot Components / Sensor
- How it work
- System Placement
- Demo



Definition:

Computer term: (Wikipedia) – is a computer security mechanism set to detect, deflect, or, in some manner, counteract attempts at unauthorized use of information systems. Consist of data seem legitimate and contain valuable resource to attackers but actually isolated and monitored. ("baiting").

• Purposes:

- Admin can watch the attacker exploit the vulnerabilities of the system, learning where the system has weakness that need to be redesigned.
- Attacker can be caught and stop while trying to obtain access to the system.
- Studying the hackers/attackers activities, developer/designers can better create more secure system that are potentially vulnerable in the future.

- 2 categories Honeypot type:
 - Production is one used within an organization's environment to help mitigate the risk.
 - To assist an organization in protecting its internal IT Infrastructure.
 - Help to reduce the risk and secure the organization by policing its IT environment to identify attack.
 - The implementation and deployment are relatively easy
 - Are like the police.

- Research add value to research in computer security by providing a platform to study the threat
 - Implementation and deployment are complex.
 - Design to collect as much information as possible about the attackers/hackers and their activity
 - Primary task to research the threat organization may face.
 - Are like CSI (the police intelligence counterpart)

- 3 Honeypot classification:
 - Low-interaction honeypots (LiH)
 - The easiest to install, configure, deploy and maintain – simple design and basic functionality.
 - Emulate variety of services and have the lowest level of risk.
 - Emulate several running services like telnet, SSH, FTP – honeypot capture and collect the login attempt but there is no real operating system for attacker to logon.

Medium-interaction Honeypot (MiH)

- More advanced than LiH.
- Also do not have real operating system
- The services provided more sophisticated technically.
- The risk also increases especially with regards to vulnerability.

High-interaction honeypots (HiH)

- A complex solution and involve the deployment of real operating system and applications.
- Capture extensive amount of information.
- Allowing attacker/hackers to interact with real system full extent of their behavior can be studied and recorded.
- E.g : Honeynets and Sebek.
- Time consuming to design, manage and maintain.
- Posses a huge risk but the information and evidence gathered for analysis is very large.
- What we can learn tools that hackers use, exploits type, vulnerability they love to exploit, hackers/attackers knowledge (the way they surfing their way through operating system and how they interact with the system.

- Honeypot & Function: (https://github.com/paralax/awesome-honeypots)
 - Low-interaction honeypots (LiH)
 - Honeyd (2003) simple network emulation tools (evolved to Nepenthes)
 - Dionaea capture attack payload and malware (Nepenthes successor)
 - Glastopf Web attack (port 80)
 - Conpot SCADA/ICS systems
 - Thug crawl and evaluate potentially malicious web sites.
 - Medium-interaction Honeypot (MiH)
 - MultiPot capture shellcode and payload (listening on multiple vulnerable and backdoor ports)
 - Mwcollectd malware collection daemon.
 - Amun (LiH & MiH) vulnerability emulation honeypot.
 - High-interaction honeypots (HiH)
 - Sshhipot MiTM SSH Honeypot

Degree of involvement	Low	Medium	High
Installation and configuration effort	Easy	Medium	Difficult
Deployment and maintenance effort	Easy	Medium	Difficult
Information Gathering	Limited	Medium	Extensive
Level of Risk	Low	Medium	High




Advantages:


- Focused (small data sets)
- Help reducing false positive
- Help to catch unknown attack (false negative)
- Can capture encrypted activity (e.g Sebek)
- Work with IPv6
- Are very flexible
- Require minimal resources.
- simplicity

Disadvantages:

- Field of view limited (focused)
- Risk (low, medium or high)

HONEYPOT INFRASTRUCTURE







HONEYNET: IS ARCHITECTURE NOT A PRODUCT

• Definition:

- 2 or more honeypots on a network
- Used for monitoring a larger and/more diverse network.
- Honeynet & honeypot as part of larger network intrusion detection systems.
- A honey farm a centralized collection of honeypots and analysis tool.
- Honeynet concept began in 1999 when Lance Spitzner (Honeynet Project Founder) published the paper "To build a honeypot".

• How it's works:

- Monitoring, capturing and analyzing all the packet entering or leaving through networks
- All traffic is entering or leaving through the Honeynet is naturally suspect.
- E.g Modern Honey Network (MHN) open source Honeynet
 Management Platform. (https://threatstream.github.io/mhn/)
- https://hq.honeynet.asia/ui/honeymap/

WHAT IS T-POT

- T-Pot Multi-Honeypot Platform: Deutsche Telekom's honeypot project
- http://sicherheitstacho.eu/start/main (community data submission)
 - T-Pot is based on Ubuntu Server (T-Pot 17.10 runs on 16.04 LTS)
 - T-Pot 20.06 runs on Debian (Stable)
 - Honeypot daemons and support component have been paravirtualized using docker and docker-compose.
 - Allow developers to run multiple honeypot daemon on the same network interface and very low maintenance.
 - Dockerized version of honeypots: conpot, cowrie, Dionaea, elasticpot, emobility, glastopf, honeytrap, mailoney, rdpy and vnclowpot

Tools:-


- Suricata network security monitoring engine
- ELK stack visualize all event captured by T-Pot
- Elasticsearch Head web front end interaction with ELK Search cluster.
- Netdata real-time performance monitoring
- Portainer web based UI for docker
- Wetty web based SSH Client.
- Spiderfoot open source intelligence automation tools.
- Link - <u>https://dtag-dev-sec.github.io/mediator/feature/</u> <u>2017/11/07/t-pot-17.10.html</u>
 - https://github.com/telekom-security/tpotce

Secure Access To Internet **Secure Tool Access &** Kibana Dasboard @ T-Pot **Aggregate Honeypot Logs** (https://<your.ip>:64297) Ports: 127.0.0.1:64303 Persist honeypot data for 30 days (/data), persist ELK data for 90 days (/data) Suricata EWS Poster Elastic-Search Logstash Kibana Dionaea | ElasticPot | eMobility | Glastopf | Honeytrap | Mailoney Netdata Portainer | Spiderfoot Conpot Cowrie Rdpy Vnclowpot Start containers from images via docker-compose Elastic-EWS Poster Kibana Head Cowrie Dionaea ElasticPot eMobility Glastopf Mailoney Vnclowpot Suricata Portainer Spiderfoot Logstash Conpot Honeytrap Rdpy Netdata Search () --5 **3** (a) **5** Build Docker images in Docker Cloud from Dockerfiles stored in dtag-dev-sec's GitHub repositories

Based on Open Source Ubuntu Server 16.04.x (x64) unattended install & cloud based images Hardware min. / rec. RAM 4GB / 8GB SSD 64GB / 128GB



CURRENT - T-POT ARCHITECTURE



T-POT – COMPONENTS / SENSORS

Bil	Sensor	Fungsi / Keterangan
1.	Suricata	Bertindak seperti intrusion detection (IDS), mengesan dan memantau serangan ke atas rangkaian.
2.	Conpot	Analisa ancaman berkaitan dengan system berkaitan infrastruktur industry seperti SNMP, IPMI, SCADA (Port : 81,102,502, 161 (UDP))
3.	Cowrie	Merekodkan serangan brute-force (DDoS) (Port: 22 (SSH))
4.	Dionaea	Perangkap payloads attack, malware, shellcode dan TLS (Port: 21 (FTP), 42 (WINS), 135, 443 (HTTPS), 445 (SMB), 1433 (MSSQL), 3306(MySQL), 5060(SIP), 5061(SIP TLS), 8081(EMC Backup), 69 (TFTP).
5.	Elasticpot	Serangan ke ELK server (Port: 9200)
6.	Emobility	Port 8080, yang selalu digunakan oleh system yang mempunyai antaramuka web untuk kawalan berpusat.
7.	Glastopf	Port 80, memerangkap trafik serangan ke atas laman web.
8.	Honeytrap	Port 25 (SMTP), 110 (Pop3), 139(NetBios Session), 3389 (RDP) 4444 (listener port Oracle WebCenter), 4899(RAT) 5900 (VNC) 21000 (IRTrans)
9.	Mailoney	A low-interaction SMTP honeypot (Port: 25, 465, 587) - https://github.com/awhitehatter/mailoney
10.	Rdpy	A low-interaction RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol) honeypot (https://github.com/citronneur/rdpy)
11.	vnclowport	A low-interaction VNC honeypot. (https://github.com/magisterquis/vnclowpot)


T-POT – CURRENT COMPONENTS / SENSORS

T-POT 20.06 RUNS ON DEBIAN (STABLE)


- adbhoney android debug bridge over TCP/IP
- ciscoasa CISCO ASA (CVE-2018-0101, a DoS & remote code execution vulnerability)
- citrixhoneypot detect and log CVE-2019-19781 scan and exploitation attempts
- dicompot digital imaging and communications in medicine (DICOM) honeypot
- glutton ssh & TCP Proxy (MITM between attacker and server to log everything in plain text
- heralding collects crendentials (protocols: ftp, telnet, ssh, http, https, pop3,pop3s, imap, imaps, smtp, vnc, postgresql, socks5)

- honeypy A low interaction honeypot with the capability to be more of a medium interaction honeypot
- honeysap low-interaction research-focused honeypot specific for SAP services
- Ipphoney A honeypot for the Internet Printing Protocol
- Medpot HL7 FHIR (Fast Health Interoperability Resources)
 Heatlhcare Interoperability
- Snare / Tanner web application honeypot sensor (successor of Glastopf)

HOW IT'S WORK




T-POT – SYSTEM PLACEMENT



- Reachable through the Internet (if not then will capture internal network only)
- In front of the Firewall (Internet)
- DMZ (De-militarized Zone)
- Behind the firewall (NAT) Internal & External
- multi-VLAN: put sensor on every VLAN and push log to main (master).




T-POT – SYSTEM PLACEMENT




BOOKS

 The Cuckoo's Egg: Tracking A spy through the maze of computer espionage – Cliff Stoll (2005)




 Silence on the wire: A Field Guide to Passive Reconnaissance and Indirect Attack –

Michal Zalewski (2005)




 Honeypot: A New Paradigm to Information Security –

R.C Joshi & Anjali Sardana (2011)




Honeypot: Tracking Hackers –

Lance Spitzner (2003)




Virtual
Honeypots
: From
Botnet
Tracking
to
Intrusion
Detection
(2007)




Intrusion
 Detection
 Honeypots:
 Detection
 Through
 Deception

Chris Sanders (2020)



HONEYPOT - UPSI

T-Pot Honeypot Deployment



APNIC Collaboration



DEMO

